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Ecuador and the 
Responsibility to Protect: 
A case for constructive 
engagement
Dolores Bermeo Lara
Introduction
In order to fully understand the Ecuadorian government’s position 
towards the Responsibility to Protect it is important to start by point-
ing out some characteristics of the country´s political context.
The concept of the Responsibility to Protect from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity was approved 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2005, 
as part of the 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1).¹ In April 
of the same year, the president of Ecuador, Lucio Gutiérrez, left the 
presidential palace pressed by the  protests against his administration, 
and the National Congress, acting under the constitutional norm of 
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 “abandono del cargo ”, put an end to his presidency.² As a result, the 
Congress proclaimed Vice President Alfredo Palacio as the country’s 
new President. This was the closing event of one of the most convul-
sive decades the country had lived through since the instauration of 
democracy in 1979.3
As a result of the political mobilization that lead to the appointment 
of the new President and general political instability, a new politi-
cal movement called Alianza País was born. Its leader, Rafael Correa, 
won the presidential elections on 26 November 2006 and took office 
in January 2007, directing, up to the present, the process of the so-
called Revolución Ciudadana (Citizen´s Revolution).4
Since then, Ecuador has gone through a vast transformation in all 
aspects of its political, economic, social and institutional life in the 
context of a process based on the idea of the “Socialismo del Buen 
Vivir” (Socialism of Good Living) and on the Constitution. This 
process has been developed and implemented through the docu-
ments that represents the political position of the government, called 
“Plans”: National Plan of Development 2007-2010, National Plan for 
the Good Living 2009-2013 and the National Plan for the Good Living 
2013-2017.5  
In the eight years since this new political and economic model was es-
tablished in the country, it would be expected that Ecuador’s foreign 
policy position would be consistent, including its position regarding 
the Responsibility to Protect. Given that  the official information 
about the Ecuador’s political position on the Responsibility to Pro-
tect is limited, the purpose of this article is to analyze that position, 
through an observation of the political guidelines drawn from the 
country’s Constitution, the National Plan for Good Living 2013-2017 
and, mainly, through a review of the statements of the Ecuadorean 
delegation at the General Assembly’s annual RtoP dialogues.
Ecuador and the Responsibility to Protect
According to the country´s current Constitution, Ecuador is a State 
of rights and justice,  Article 1 of the Constitution state that: “Ecuador 
es un Estado constitucional de derechos y justicia, social y democrático, 
soberano, independiente, unitario, intercultural, plurinacional y laico. 
Se organiza en forma de república y se gobierna de manera descentral-
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izada.”6 Among the fundamental duties of the State is guaranteeing 
its inhabitants the right to a culture of peace, to integral security 
and to live in a democratic society free of corruption (art. 3 num. 8). 
As for human rights, they are at the core of the constitutional text, 
hence the relevance of international treaties on human rights:
La Constitución y los tratados internacionales de derechos hu-
manos ratificados por el Estado que reconozcan derechos más 
favorables a los contenidos en la Constitución, prevalecerán 
sobre cualquier otra norma jurídica o acto del poder público. 
(art. 424). Los derechos consagrados en la Constitución y los 
instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos serán de in-
mediato cumplimiento y aplicación. (art. 426).
The National Plan for Good Living 2013-2017 -a document that re-
flects the position of the government policy through twelve national 
objectives- reaffirms the notion of the Ecuador as a Constitutional 
State of justice and fundamental rights, established in the Constitu-
tion, and explains that this idea “lays in the center of its justification: 
the rights and guarantees of the people”.7 Human rights are considered 
“the core of the public, the very reason for having a State”, and they are 
the “foundation of the Plan, its purpose, essence and reason for being”. 
Simply put, human rights are a substantive part of the Plan.8
It is important to note that there has been a deep commitment by 
Ecuador to the norms of human rights and International Humani-
tarian Law (IHL). This is confirmed by the adoption of almost all 
international legal instruments in this regard.9 In this sense and with 
respect to the international instruments that were pointed out by the 
UN Secretary-General in his report of 2013, Ecuador currently has 
ratified almost all of them10 (see Graphic I).
An example of the commitment Ecuador has made with respect to 
the fulfillement and diffusion of the IHL, came in 2006, per Execu-
tive Order No. 1741, when the Comisión Nacional para Aplicación 
del Derecho Internacional Humanitario del Ecuador (CONADIHE) 
[National Commission for the Application of International Humani-
tarian Law of Ecuador],11 was created with the goal to promote the 
cooperation between the Government and the International Organi-
zations to reinforce the basic principles of the IHL.12
CONADIHE is a permanent organism consisting of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility (Presidency); the Ministry of 
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National Defense (Vice Presidency); the Ministry of the Interior; the 
Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion; the National Assembly; 
the General Office of the Magistrate of the State; the National Court 
of Justice; and the Ecuadorean Red Cross (Secretary). 
Undoubtedly, the commitment to the IHL by the members of the 
Armed Forces is remarkable. Hence, the measures that have been 
taken regarding this institution are considered positive, such as the 
subscription of various agreements with the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross (CICR).  In 2013 the Ministry of Defense of 
Ecuador, the National Society of the Ecuadorean Red Cross and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, subscribed the Inter-
Institutional Agreement of Cooperation to promote the integration 
of the IHL and the principles on the use of force in the doctrine, 
instruction and training of the Armed Forces of Ecuador.13
The IHL is also considered an essential element of the defense policy 
of Ecuador, as established in the Political Agenda of Defense 2014 – 
2017 [Agenda Política de la Defensa]:  
“La obligación de respetar el Derecho Internacional Humani-
tario (DIH), tanto convencional como consuetudinario, es de 
carácter estricto para el Ecuador, como Estado Parte de los 
Convenios de Ginebra de 1949 y sus Protocolos Adicionales, y 
un parámetro ineludible de comportamiento para los miembros 
de las Fuerzas Armadas del Ecuador. La obligación de integrar 
de manera permanente el Derecho Internacional Humanitario 
se refleja en la actualización de la formación y entrenamien-
to, y especialmente en la actualización de la doctrina militar 
conforme a las normas del DIH y los principios elementales de 
humanidad, de manera que las Fuerzas Armadas cuenten con 
mecanismos suficientes para su efectiva publicación.”14
With reference to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing (Key aspects of the Responsibility to Protect15), the 
Constitution of Ecuador establishes that there is no statute of limita-
tions of these actions or for  the punishments for such crimes.
Las acciones y penas por delitos de genocidio, lesa humani-
dad, crímenes de guerra, desaparición forzada de personas o 
crímenes de agresión a un Estado serán imprescriptibles. Nin-
guno de estos casos será susceptible de amnistía. El hecho de 
que una de esas infracciones haya sido cometida por un subor-
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dinado no eximirá de responsabilidad penal al superior que la 
ordenó ni al subordinado que la ejecutó. (art. 80).
Additionally, genocide and crimes against humanity are among the 
70 new transgressions established in the Organic Comprehensive 
Criminal Code [Código Orgánico Integral  Penal, COIP] effective 
since 10 August 2014.16 It is important to point out the criminaliza-
tion of ethnocide, which is based on cultural identity. With respect to 
the rules of the IHL, COIP develops in 28 articles the crimes against 
persons and property protected by the IHL (see Graphics II and II.a).
Overall, it can be said that according to the Constitution and the 
Plan for the Good Living, Ecuador is a State that assumes its respon-
sibility to protect its population based on the empowerment of its 
society, and based on the promotion and guarantee of fundamental 
human rights. This responsibility was recognized in the UN Secre-
tary-General’s General Secretary’s report of 2013, Responsibility to 
Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention (A/67/922-S/2013/399).
“In Ecuador, the Constitution serves as the foundation 
for social protection policies and more inclusive economic 
growth. The adoption of a national development plan has 
paved the way for the promotion of inclusiveness and trans-
parency by incorporating social actors in the development 
process” (para. 46).
In order to proceed with the aim of this chapter –to explain the posi-
tion of Ecuador with respect to the Responsibility to Protect– and 
since it is not expressly mentioned in any other document of public 
policy, what follows is a review of the statements of the Ecuadorean 
Delegation at the General Assembly’s annual RtoP dialogues.
Since 2009, the UN General Assembly has held six interactive dia-
logues on the Responsibility to Protect, based on the Annual Reports 
of the Secretary-General.17 The Ecuadorean delegation to the UN has 
participated in three of the mentioned dialogues, conducted in 2009, 
2013 and 2014.18
In order to understand Ecuador’s position, the perspectives will be 
analyzed through two aspects of the concept of the Responsibility to 
Protect: institutional and operational.
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Institutional Aspects
With regards to the institutionalization of the RtoP in the frame-
work of the United Nations, the concept of Responsibility to Protect 
has not been rejected by Ecuador. On the contrary, in the debate of 
2013, the Ecuadorean delegation explicitly stated: “My country rec-
ognizes that the Responsibility to Protect is intrinsic to the notion 
of a sovereign State”. In addition Ecuador agreed on the respect of 
the three pillars strategy established by the Secretary-General, as it 
has not manifested a negative opinion regarding this point and has 
expressed: “Es importante asegurar que los tres pilares sean abordados 
de manera balanceada puesto que cada uno de ellos se refiere a temas de 
gran importancia para nuestros Estados”  (Debate 2009).
However, the Ecuadorean delegation has reiterated that the concept 
is still in discussion and still being debated until the UN General 
Assembly decides otherwise (Debate 2013). For Ecuador, the rec-
ommendations of the General Secretary, like those in the Report of 
2013,19 will be accepted when an agreement is reached in the General 
Assembly on the following aspects:
·	 The definition of the Responsibility to Protect and its scope
·	 The manner in which the motives can be determined as suf-
ficient to legitimize an international intervention
·	 The manner in which the military strength would be used, 
eventually and as a last resort.
Such aspects would relate to the elements that the Ecuadorean del-
egation has signed reiteratively, on which the concept of legitimacy of 
the Responsibility to Protect would be sustained:
1) The clear establishment of the motives that can be consid-
ered sufficient to legitimize international intervention.
2) The establishment of clear case-by-case support on the even-
tual intervention excluding the usurpation of State or natural 
resources.
3) The use of force should be the last possible option after hav-
ing exhausted all peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms 
and under the exclusive authorization of the Security Coun-
cil under Chapter 7.
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4) There must be a clear follow up on the mechanisms that are 
established in the Resolution on the use of force, in order to 
avoid excesses as set by the Security Council.
5) There must be compliance with the provisions of the UN 
Charter on the way in which the military would act on behalf 
of the international community.
I must highlight the statement made by Ecuador about the protec-
tion of the civil population which was made in the context of the 6th 
Annual Ministerial Meeting on the Responsibility to Protect of 27 
September 2013, co-hosted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands and Nigeria: 
“Concebimos a la protección a la población civil como un 
compromiso racional, indeclinable y firme de la comunidad 
de Estados, basado estrictamente en normas internacionales 
y defendemos el rol de la Corte Penal Internacional como el 
único medio por el cual se puede terminar con la impunidad de 
aquellos criminales que asesinan a su propio pueblo o a pueb-
los ajenos por lo cual demandamos que el Estatuto de Roma 
sea ratificado sin demora por todos los Estados miembros de 
Nacionales Unidas” 20
Operational Aspect
This section is intended to explain the political position of Ecuador 
regarding the phases of the Responsibility to Protect: early warning, 
prevention, and use of force. With respect to the first two, there is 
no objection. What the Ecuadorean Delegation has pointed out is 
that “the prevention of conflicts through the use of peaceful dispute 
settlement is the only legal and efficacious manner of avoiding the 
crimes that are set forth in paragraphs 138 and 139 of Resolution 60/1 
of 24 October 2005 come about”, and besides, that Ecuador “firmly 
believes in the roles of regional and sub-regional organizations in the 
prevention of the aforementioned crimes” (Debate 2013).
It is important to note that regarding the use of force, the Delegation 
of Ecuador, initially contested the legitimacy of the Security Council 
to act and to adopt collective measures according with Chapter VII 
of the Charter. 
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“Debemos aceptar que lamentablemente el Consejo no ha sido 
un actor objetivo, eficaz e imparcial y que sus decisiones no han 
tenido la transparencia y la neutralidad deseadas. Es entonces 
legítimo preguntarnos si en realidad el Consejo de Seguridad 
en su composición actual y los mecanismos de toma de decisio-
nes vigentes debe ser la autoridad encargada de autorizar in-
tervenciones militares para propósitos de protección humana o 
si se debería antes avanzar en una reforma profunda e integral 
del Consejo que lo revista de legitimidad y eficacia?” (Debate 
2009)
However, this statement was eventually surpassed in the next two 
debates, when Ecuador asserted the role of the Security Council with 
respect to the adoption of collective measures. Specifically in the de-
bate of 2013, the following was expressed:
“The commitment of the international community to adopt-
ing the collective measures mentioned above can only come 
about through the Security Council and in step with the UN 
Charter. Any use of force outside of this framework is illegal 
and illegitimate, and is a mere act of aggression against a sov-
ereign State, regardless of who commits it and the pretext 
used to justify it.”
Besides, in the above mentioned Ministerial Meeting of 2013, the 
Ecuadorean delegation expressed their rejection of the unilaterally 
use of force without authorization of UN Security Council, and  the 
preventive use of force as part of the concept of the Responsibility 
to Protect, considering that this idea contradicts the third pillar. It 
draws attention, since none of the official documents concerning 
RtoP; particularly the reports of the Secretary-General, refer to pre-
ventive use of force to protect populations or the possibility that any 
State can intervene without authorization. 
However, it is important to recognize that the use of force in the con-
text of the Responsibility to Protect is a complex issue that creates 
ambiguity and contradictions. For this reason, it is essential that the 
United Nations bodies in charge of the doctrinal development of the 
RtoP, to address the concerns that exist on the subject, in order to 
clarify the doubts and avoid misperceptions and misinterpretations 
that arise from a lack of a clear explanation.
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Considerations Regarding Ecuador’s Statements at the UN
It is possible to affirm that Ecuador has implicitly accepted RtoP. 
However, Ecuador believes it is necessary to establish the mecha-
nisms of the application and implementation of RtoP, especially 
when related to the use of force to protect  a population. This can be 
drawn from the remarks on a series of elements that are considered 
necessary for legitimating an intervention with the purpose of pro-
tecting the population.
Despite the theoretical, juridical and operative gaps that still involve 
the concept of Responsibility to Protect, Ecuador recognizes that the 
UN must act to protect people from atrocities. This was expressed in 
the debate of 2009, which pointed out that the UN must not remain 
in silence, but must address the perpetration of atrocities and act 
based on international law.
As we can observe, for Ecuador, the principles of international law, es-
pecially the ones such as non-intervention, abstention from the use of 
force, and sovereign equality, are of vital importance, not only for the 
relations between the States, but also as the axis that guide domestic 
policies. The principle of sovereignty in Ecuador is conceived in two 
dimensions: human and territorial. Evidence of this is the insertion 
of a plural notion of sovereignties contained in the Constitution.21
It can be concluded that Ecuador understands sovereignty as respon-
sibility as one of the theoretical fundaments of the Responsibility 
to Protect. The issue which worries Ecuador, according to the state-
ments of its delegation in the UN’s, is the notion of intervention for 
human protection purposes. This component of Responsibility to 
Protect, is problematic, given Ecuador’s concerns that these can be 
“interventions disguised as humanitarianism” (Debate 2013). Still, 
Ecuador has not denied the possibility of the use of force to protect 
the population whenever it is authorized by the Security Council.
Despite Ecuador’s concern with the complex problem of Responsi-
bility to Protect and the use of force, its delegation did not partici-
pate in the interactive debate of 2012, where the Report of the Secre-
tary-General Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response 
(A/66/874-S/2012/578) was used as a reference for the discussion in 
which the utilization of  military force, in accordance to Chapter VII 
of the Charter was discussed. 
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It must also be observed that – however extensive the analysis about 
the prevention of mass atrocity crimes developed in the reports of the 
General Secretary, including the 2013 report which explained some of 
the risk factors related to atrocity crimes and the difference between 
conflict prevention and atrocity prevention – thus far, the Ecuador-
ean delegation has been centered exclusively in the prevention of 
conflicts, which doesn’t contribute to the debate and the generation 
of proposals to strengthen mass atrocity prevention.
Conclusion
On the basis of the examination of the principal documents that de-
fine the political guidelines in Ecuador, like the Constitution and 
the National Plan for Good Living 2013-2017, and considering the 
statements of the Ecuadorean delegation has made in debates about 
the Responsibility to Protect and which have been conducted at the 
General Assembly, it can be concluded that -at least implicitly- Ec-
uador has not denied the validity and promotion of Responsibility to 
Protect. Ecuador accepts the strategy of the three pillars developed 
by the General Secretary and supports the possibility of to the use of 
force when authorized by the Security Council.
What Ecuador reiterates is the necessity to clarify the application 
and implementation of the concept, especially when force is used to 
protect  the population,  a preoccupation which is not new on the 
global stage. This is confirmed by the diversity of analyses, debates 
and opinions that have been generated about the subject. In this re-
spect, it is pertinent to note the opinion of Navi Pillay, former UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, who, regarding the interven-
tion in Libya in 2011, stated: 
“Since the Security Council resolution authorized the use of 
force under the mantle of protection of civilians and RtoP, 
in an operation that ended in regime change, questions were 
raised as to whether regimen change is a means of giving effect 
to the legitimate principles of RtoP and protection of civilians. 
[…] It is clear that the concept itself cannot be faulted. As far 
as I can see, no objection has been raised to the concept itself 
but to its application and implementation. RtoP, like human 
rights, must never become politicized, employed selectively or 
be the weapon for double standards and regime change.”22
Dolores Bermeo Lara
203
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
1
In relation to the Ecuadorean’s statements at the General Assem-
bly, they are repetitive, without any concrete proposals to advance 
the discussion of the theoretical and juridical development of the 
concept, or any possible ways that permit the adequate and effective 
implementation of the Responsibility to Protect when it is related to 
the use of force or other coercive measures.
An element that is considered negative is the limited information 
about the position of Ecuador regarding Responsibility to Protect, 
which generates confusion in some cases and misunderstanding in 
others. One example of this is the false perception of Ecuador as an 
adversary of Responsibility to Protect seen in some scholars’ work.23
Additionally, Ecuador’s occasionally divergent position in the cases 
where it is evident that atrocities exist generates a negative percep-
tion about Ecuador’s role as a promoter of human rights in the inter-
national arena. An example of this is Ecuador’s vote against the draft 
resolution about the situation of human rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, approved in 18 November 2014.24
In general, the political position of Ecuador in regards to the Respon-
sibility to Protect is considered ambivalent. To answer to this charac-
terization, it is important that Ecuador specifies its position about 
the Responsibility to Protect with a clear and precise explanation of 
its position. Additionally, it would be expected that the Ecuadorean 
delegation’s statements were not repetitive at the General Assembly. 
Rather, Ecuador should contribute with specific proposals about the 
measures that the international community can carry out in order to 
prevent, or respond to the suffering of millions of people, victims of 
irrationality.
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Graphic I
Ecuador And The International Legal Instruments 
Indicated By Un Secretary-General 
Instruments Signature RatificationAccession (a) 
Entry into 
force
Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Dec. 9,1948)
11 Dec 1948 21 Dec 1949 12 Jan 1951
International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (16 
December 1966)
Second Optional Protocol (15 
December 1989)
4 Apr 1968
6 Mar 1969
23 Feb 1993 (a)
23 Mar 1976
11 Jul 1991
International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultur-
al Rights (16 December 1966)
29 Sep 1967 6 Mar 1969 3 Jan 1976
Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment. (10 December 1984)
4 Feb 1985 30 Mar 1988 26 Jun 1987
Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women (18 
December 1979)
17 Jul 1980 9 Nov 1981 3 Sep 1981
International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (7 
March 1966)
22 Sep 1966
(a) 4 Jan 1969
Convention of 1961 on the 
Statute of the Refugees and 
its Protocol of 1967
17 Aug 1955 (a)
6 Mar 1969 (a)
22 Apr 1954
4 Oct 1967
Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (20 November 
1989)
26 Jan 1990 23 Mar 1990 2 Sep 1990
Statute of Rome of the Inter-
national Penal Court (17 July 
1998)
7 Oct 1998 5 Feb 2002 1 Jul 2002
Arms Trade Treaty (2 April 
2013)*
24 Decem-
ber 2014
Source: Information based on the information contained in CHAPTER 
IV: Human Rights, available in <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.
aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en>, and <http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/
scripts/doc.php?file=biblioteca/pdf0506>.
** The Ecuadorean Delegation abstained from voting regarding to the draft 
resolution entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”, (A/67/L.58) , 71st. Plenary 
meeting General Assembly, 2 April 2013. Official Records (A/67/PV.71) see 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/>
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Grapihc II
Organic Comprehensive Criminal Code (COIP)
Crimes Against Humanity Penalty
Art.79 Genocide.- The person who, in a systematic and generalized 
manner, and with the intention to destroy in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnic, religious or political group, commit any of the 
following acts:
1. Killing members of the group.
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.
3. Deliberately inflicting to conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part
4. Adoption of forced measures intended to prevent births within 
the group
5. Forced transferring children or adolescents of the group to 
another group. 26-30 yrs
Art. 81 Extermination
Art. 86 Persecution 
Art. 87 Apartheid
Art. 88 Aggression
Art.89 Crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity are 
those that are committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population: the extrajudicial 
execution, the enslavement, the forced displacement of population 
that has not the purpose to protect their rights, the illegal or 
arbitrary privation of the freedom, torture, rape and enforced 
prostitution, insemination not permitted, enforced sterilization 
and the enforced disappearance. 
Art. 82 Enslavement
22 – 26 yrs
Art.83 Deportation of forcible transfer of populations
Art. 84 Enforced disappearance
Art. 85 Extrajudicial execution
Art. 80 Ethnocide.- The person who deliberated, generalized and 
systematic manner destroys in whole or in part the cultural identity 
of towns in voluntary isolation.
16 – 19 yrs
Art. 90 Penalty for a legal entity. When a legal entity is found to 
be responsible of any of these crimes it will be sanctioned with its 
extinction. 
Source: Código Orgánico Integral Penal. R.O. No. 180, February  10, 2014. 
Unofficial translation.
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Grapihc II. A.
Organic Comprehensive Criminal Code (COIP)
Crimes against persons and property protected by the 
International Humanitarian Law Penalty
Murder of protected person (art.115) 22 – 26 yrs
Mutilations or experiments in protected person ((art 118)
Torture , cruelty and degrading treatments to protected person 
(art 119)
Collective Punishments to protective persons (art.120)
Use of prohibited methods in armed conflict (art. 121)
Use of prohibited weapons (art. 122)
Attacks to protected property (art.123)
13 - 16 yrs
Obstruction of sanitary and humanitarian work (art. 124)
Freedom privation of protected person (art. 125)
Attack to protected person with terrorist purpose (art. 126)
Recruiting of children and adolescents (art. 127)
Taking of hostages (art. 128)
Infractions against the active participants in armed conflict (art. 
129)
10 – 13 yrs
Arbitrary and illegal transfer (art. 130)
Abolition of rights of the protected person (art.131)
Environmental modification with military purposes (art.132)
7 – 10 yrs
Denegation of juridical guarantees of protected person (art.133)
Omission of measures of aid and humanitarian assistance 
(art.134)
Omission of measures of protection (art. 135)
Arbitrary Contributions (art 136)
Prolongation of hostilities (art. 137)
5 – 7 yrs
Destruction or appropriation of goods to the adversary part 
(art.138) 3 – 5 yrs
Abuse of emblems (art.139) 1 – 3 yrs
Transgression to sexual and reproductive integrity of protected 
person (art 116) *
Damage to physical integrity to the protected person (art 117) 5 – 7 yrs + 1/2
* Punishment increased in one third, respect of the transgressions against the sexual 
and reproductive integrity (art. 164 – 175).
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NOTES
1. The draw resolution A/60/L. 1, entitled 2005 World Summit Outcome 
was adopted without vote. Meeting Record, 8th plenary meeting of 
the UN General Assembly, September 16 2005 (A/60/PV.8). Available 
at <http://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/60>.
2. Constitución del Ecuador de 1998, art. 167 No. 6. Available at <http://
www.cancilleria.gob.ec/constituciones-del-ecuador-desde-1830-has-
ta-2008/>
3. During ten years three elected Presidents were overthrown: Abdalá 
Bucaram in 1997; Jamil Mahuad in 2003 and Lucio Gutierrez in 
2005. See, G. Fontaine, J.L. Fuentes “Transición hacia el Centralismo 
Burocrático”. Estado del País. Informe Cero. Ecuador 1950-2010. First 
Edition May 2011. pp. 247-262.
4. For more information about Citizen Revolution <http://www.movi-
mientoalianzapais.com.ec/mas-publicaciones>.
5. Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo SENPLADES, avai-
lable at <http://www.buenvivir.gob.ec/>.
6. The text of the Constitution was approved by Referendum on Sept-
ember 2008. See <http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/constituciones-del-
ecuador-desde-1830-hasta-2008/ >
7. National Plan for Good Living 2013-2017, Secretaría Nacional de Pla-
nificación y Desarrollo SENPLADES [National Secretariat of Planning 
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